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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1342 
___________ 
 
WAYNE B. MITTON, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-07399) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 27, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 28, 2016) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Before this Court is Wayne Mitton’s appeal of the Order of the District Court, 
affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied him 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-
434, and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
Mitton fractured his right wrist in 2006 and was hospitalized due to suicidal 
thoughts and depression in 2008.  Afterward, Mitton continued to experience physical 
and mental symptoms and to receive medical treatment, as detailed in the April 22, 2013 
opinion of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  In April 2009, Mitton filed 
applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under 
the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date of June 6, 2008.  Applying our 
five-step test pursuant to Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999), and relying 
on the testimony of a vocational expert who stated that Mitton could work as a mail clerk 
or as an inspector and hand packager, the ALJ found that Mitton was not disabled on 
June 6, 2008 or at any point after.  Accordingly, Mitton’s applications for Disability 
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income were denied.   
Mitton requested review of the ALJ’s decision in the District Court, which 
affirmed the Commissioner’s disability determination.  We are now called upon to review 
that affirmance by the District Court.   
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II. Discussion1 
Two issues are presented by this appeal: (1) whether, in relying on the vocational 
expert’s testimony to determine that Mitton was not disabled, the ALJ did not recognize 
and properly consider a conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), and (2) whether sufficient evidence 
supported the ALJ’s ultimate disability determination.  Our review is plenary over these 
legal issues, Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012), and we 
address both in turn. 
First, we perceive no error in the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational expert’s 
testimony.  The ALJ found, as required by Social Security Ruling 00-4p, that the 
testimony was consistent with the DOT, and the ALJ thereby fulfilled his responsibility 
to address and to resolve any possible conflict.  See SSR 00-4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,759, 
75,760 (Dec. 4, 2000).  Although there is an argument that the vocational expert’s 
testimony conflicted with the DOT listings for “mail clerk” and for “inspector and hand 
packager,” that argument rests on inaccurately characterizing the DOT listings as 
requiring frequent handling with both hands.  The listings impose no such bilateral 
requirement.  See Emp’t & Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles § 209.687-026 (4th ed. 1991), 1991 WL 671813 (“mail clerk”); id. 
§ 559.687-074, 1991 WL 683797 (“inspector and hand packager”); accord Carey v. 
Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000).  For that reason, despite acknowledging that 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Mitton had only occasional grasping and holding capabilities in one of his hands, the 
vocational expert stated that Mitton could work as a mail clerk, or as an inspector and 
hand packager, by using his unaffected hand more frequently.  Because that statement 
does not conflict with the relevant DOT listings, the ALJ’s reliance on the vocational 
expert’s testimony was permissible. 
Second, we conclude substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s ultimate disability 
determination.  We apply the same standard of review as the District Court to assess 
whether the ALJ’s disability determination is supported by substantial evidence, see 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g); Hagans, 694 F.3d at 292.  Substantial evidence “is more than a mere 
scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate.”  Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427).  “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the 
factual inquiry differently.”  Hagans, 694 F.3d at 292 (quoting Fargnoli v. Massanari, 
247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
Here, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Mitton was not 
disabled.  As the ALJ observed in his opinion, Mitton testified that he regularly 
performed a wide array of indoor and outdoor household chores, such as making his bed, 
loading the dishwasher, taking out the garbage, mowing the lawn, and taking care of the 
pool.  Mitton even testified that he had no difficulty with fine manipulation, such as when 
tying his shoes.  Given this record, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion 
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that Mitton could work as a mail clerk or as an inspector and hand packager and, thus, 
that he was not disabled.   
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in affirming the 
Commissioner’s denial of Mitton’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income, and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
